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I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Appellant. 
No. 15613 
BRIEF OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a disciplinary action initiated by the Utah State 
Bar against lawyer-appellant, Phil L. Hansen. The Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar has recommended to this 
Court that appellant be suspended from the practice of law for 
a period of one year. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE BAR 
A complaint was lodged with the Utah State Bar on August 
25, 1976 by Kay Lou Behunin alleging certain misconduct of her 
attorney, Phil Hansen. (Exhibit, hereinafter Ex. 20). Appel-
lant was notified of these charges by the Bar and a hearing 
was held before the Utah State Bar Screening Committee on Octo-
ber 28, 1976. As a result of this hearing a complaint was 
filed by the Chairman of the Screening Committee and served 
upon Mr. Hansen on December 29, 1976. The complaint charged 
Hansen with violation of five specific disciplinary rules. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Hansen requested that the matter be remanded to the Screening 
Committee on the grounds that he had not been afforded an op-
portunity to appear and present his defense. This motion 
was denied by the Trial Committee on January 24, 1977 and an 
answer was filed by Mr. Hansen on February 15, 1977. The de-
position of Hansen was taken on March 22, 1977 and the depo-
sition of Kay Lou Behunin, the complainant, was taken on April 
29, 1977. 
A hearing was held before three members of the Utah State 
Bar Commission on September 29, 1977. On January 12, 1978 the 
Panel issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re-
commending the suspension of appellant from the practice of 
law in Utah for a period of one year. The Utah State Bar 
Board of Commissioners, after having reviewed the evidence 
presented at the Panel hearing, recommended the adoption of 
the Panel's recommendation and issued an Order recommending 
suspension for one year. 
Appellant was found to have violated Canon 5, DR5-105 and 
Canon 2, DR2-106 of the Code of Ethics of the Utah State Bar. 
Appellant filed his notice of appeal with this Court on 
February 9, 1978. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah State Bar seeks aff irmance of the Findings and 
Recommendations made by the Utah State Bar Board of Commis-
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sioners that appellant be suspended from the practice of law 
in Utah for a period of one year. In addition, the State Bar 
would request that this Court order that Hansen refund the 
fee paid to him by complainant less the reasonable value of 
legal services performed and that Hansen be ordered to pay 
costs of this prosecution to the Utah State Bar. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah State Bar does not agree with all of the charac-
terizations and editorial comments made in appellant's State-
ment of Facts. However, because those facts relating speci-
fically to procedure, the claim of conflict, and the excessive 
fee claim will be dealt with separately in this brief an exten-
sive review of the facts in this case would serve no useful 
purpose at this point and therefore the following brief synop-
sis is offered. 
This action was initiated on August 25, 1976 when a letter 
was sent by Kay Lou Jenkins (as president of a car dealership) 
alleging certain misconduct on the part of her attorney, Phil 
Hansen. (Ex. 20). (It should be noted that all exhibits in 
this case are attached either to the original deposition of 
Phil L. Hansen or to the original transcript of the Disciplin-
ary Hearing). 
The letter of Mrs. Jenkins related several incidents and 
facts which caused her concern. In her letter she mentioned, 
-3-
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among other things, that she had paid Mr. Hansen $5,000 to 
represent her in the defense of a lawsuit, that she had diffi-
culty in communicating with him, that she was extremely con-
cerned that Hansen was simultaneously representing her in the 
civil action while representing the man suing her in a crimi-
nal case, that he was not pursuing her case, and that she 
would like some of her money back if Hansen didn't continue 
to represent her. 
After a hearing before the Disciplinary Screening Commit-
tee a complaint was issued by its chairman alleging violation 
of five specific disciplinary rules of conduct. An answer was 
filed by Mr. Hansen denying these charges. 
The deposition of Phil L. Hansen and Kay Lou Behunin 
(formerly Kay Lou Jenkins) was taken prior to the Panel Hear-
ing. 
On September 29, 1977 a full hearing was held before three 
members of the Utah State Bar Commission and evidence was pre-
sented. At that time the prosecutors voluntarily dismissed two 
charges against appellant. 
The charges remaining against appellant were violation of 
Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (excessive fee) , 5-101 (conflict of in-
terest), and 1-102 (actions prejudicial to the administration 
of justice). (Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing of September 
29, 1977, hereinafter Tr., p. 3). 
-4-
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At the hearing the following testimony was given. Kay 
Lou Behunin, the complainant, resided in Salina, Utah and was 
married in 1975 to Randall Johnson. (Tr., pp. 12-13). John-
son at that time owned a Chevrolet dealership jointly with 
Ted Burr. Johnson subsequently bought up Burr's interest and 
in November of 1975 Kay Lou divorced Johnson and purchased 
the entire Chevrolet dealership. (Tr., pp. 13-14). 
In December of 1975 Ted Burr sued Kay Lou and Johnson 
over alleged deficiencies in the accounting of the dealership 
sale. (Tr., p. 15). Kay Lou had never before been in a civil 
lawsuit. (Tr . , p . 4 6 ) • 
Kay Lou testified at the hearing that in December of 
1975 she went to Phil Hansen's office with her bookkeeper and 
business manager and presented him the complaint and several 
documents pertaining to the lawsuit. She testified that Han-
sen said he would take the case presuming she would immediately 
deposit with him $5,000. She testified that he informed her 
that this money would be retained whether or not the case went 
to trial. (Tr. , p. 4 7) . 
Hansen agreed with this testimony and added that at the 
time he reviewed the initial pleadings he intended to file an 
answer and a counterclaim for defamation. (Tr., p. 53). Han-
sen testified that the lawsuit was in the nature of breach of 
contract that required more factual accounting tha~ legal pre-
-5-
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paration. (Tr., p. 54). Both witnesses agreed that the ini-
tial meeting lasted only ten to fifteen minutes. (Tr., pp. 
18 I 52) • 
Kay Lou testified that at the time of this meeting Mr. 
Hansen did not inform her that the legal fee was non-returnable 
regardless of what events transpired. (Tr., pp. 17-18, 43). 
No contract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing 
the employment terms to writing. (Tr., p. 42). Hansen agreed 
that no writing existed showing that the fee was nonrefundable 
(Tr., p. 67) but claimed throughout the proceeding that the 
nonrefundability was agreed upon by Kay Lou. 
Kay Lou testified that she met with Hansen two weeks la-
ter in the presence of her bookkeeper and sent Hansen corres-
pondence concerning the lawsuit during 1975 and through Sep-
ternber, 197 6. (Tr., pp. 18-19). She testified that David 
Lord, an investigator for Hansen, interviewed her at Salina 
for about 45 minutes and reviewed documents in her possession. 
(Tr . , p . 2 0) . 
The claim of conflict of interest arises from the fact 
that appellant Hansen represented Ted Burr, the plaintiff in 
Kay Lou's civil case, in a criminal defense at the same time 
he continued to represent Kay Lou in the civil action. It was 
undisputed that Hans en represented both parties simultaneous l:· 
and that both actions were filed in the 6th District Court of 
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the Honorable Don Tibbs. 
However, there was a sharp conflict in the testimony be-
tween Hansen and Kay Lou as to how this dual representation 
occurred and as to whether Kay Lou had given her informed con-
sent of Hansen's representation of Burr. This conflict of 
testimony will be discussed infra in that portion of this 
brief concerning the conflict of interest charge. 
It was undisputed that the only documents filed in the 
civil case on behalf of Kay Lou was an answer and counterclaim. 
~o depositions, interrogatories, or other discovery documents 
had been prepared by Mr. Hansen during the two-year period of 
representing Kay Lou. Hansen testified it was his desire and 
that of the other parties to pursue the criminal case first 
and to postpone the civil case until after its completion. 
(Tr. , pp. 9 0, 12 6) . 
On August 25, 1976, approximately one month after Hansen 
began the representation of Burr, Kay Lou wrote the initia-
ting complaint to the Utah State Bar. (Ex. 20). Following 
this complaint to the Bar, the Disciplinary Screening Commit-
tee was convened and after taking further testimony of the com-
plainant issued the formal complaint against Hansen. After dis-
covery by both parties, a Hearing Committee consisting of Ri-
chard H. Moffat, o. Wood Moyle, and David W. Sorenson conducted 
an evidentiary hearing and recormnended that Hansen be suspended 
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from the practice of law in Utah for one year based upon vio-
lation of two rules of discipline. The Utah State Bar Com-
mission sitting as a whole reviewed these findings, reviewed 
the evidence, and adopted the decision of the Hearing Committee. 
It is from this recommendation of the Utah State Bar Com-
mission that this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HANSEN WAS NOT DENIED DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW IN THE UTAH STATE BAR DISCI-
PLINARY PROCEEDINGS. 
Before Hansen can prevail on this appeal this Court must 
be convinced that the Utah State Bar Commission has acted ar-
bitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. In Re Badger, 493 
P.2d 1273 (Utah 1972). The findings of the Board of Commis-
sioners must be accepted as facts of the case unless it ap-
pears that the Board has acted capriciously or arbitrarily or 
went beyond its powers. In Re Wade, 497 P.2d 22 (Utah 1972). 
It is the burden of Hansen upon review of a recommenda-
tion of the Utah State Bar Commission to show that the Board's 
recommendations were erroneous or unlawful. Yokozeki v. State 
Bar, 521 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1974). A disciplinary proceeding be-
fore the State Bar is sui generis. Neither civil nor criminal 
in character since the purpose of the proceeding is not to pur.-
ish the individual attorney, or to determine whether the at-
-8-
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torney is guilty of a crime, but to determine whether the at-
torney should be allowed to continue the practice of law and 
the principal objective of the proceeding is to protect the 
courts, the legal profession, and the public from persons un-
fit to practice law. The standard of proof in such cases is 
clear and convincing evidence. McComb v. Commission on Judi-
cial Performance, 564 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1977). 
Hansen in his brief argues that he had been denied due 
process of law during the disciplinary proceedings in four 
respects: first, that he was not given ample opportunity to 
be present at the Disciplinary Screening Committee Hearing 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13); second, that he was not given 
sufficient notice nor were the pleadings properly framed as 
to the violation of DR5-105 concerning the conflict of in-
terest charge (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-30); third, that Han-
sen was not given sufficient notice nor charged properly with 
violation of DR2-106 concerning excessive fees (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 30-34); and fourth, that the Board of Commissioners 
did not base its Order on proper evidence (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 34-35). A review of the record in this case clearly shows 
that each of Hansen's contentions is without merit. 
A. Hansen was Given Ample Opportunity to be Present at 
the Disciplinary Screening Committee. 
Hansen in his brief argues that he was not given suff i-
·.~ ien t notice of the Screening Committee Hearing on October 28, 
-9-
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1976 and that, in any case, the charges made by the Committee 
went beyond the allegations contained in Kay Lou's letter. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14). Both arguments are erroneous. 
The letter signed by Kay Lou Jenkins and addressed to 
the Utah State Bar was dated August 25, 1976. (Ex. 20). On 
September 2, 1976 Dean Sheffield sent a letter to Hansen with 
a copy of the Kay Lou Jenkins' letter enclosed. He requested 
that a response be made within ten days. (Ex. 1). On Sep-
tember 24 a second letter was addressed to Hansen stating that 
no response to the first letter had been received and advising 
him that an answer must be made within ten days. Again, a 
copy of the original letter was enclosed. (Ex. 2). 
Finally, on October 26, 1976 Sheffield wrote to Hansen 
informing him that no response had been received as to the 
September 24 letter and that a hearing was to be held on Octa-
ber 28 before _the Disciplinary Screening Committee. (Ex. 3). 
Hansen in his deposition admitted receiving all of these let-
ters prior to the Disciplinary Screening Committee Hearing. 
(Deposition of Phil Hansen, March 22, 1977, hereinafter Hansen 
Depo., p. 6). 
Hansen claimed that he sent a letter to Sheffield on Sep-
tember 20, 1976 but the correspondence from Sheffield stating 
that no response had been received indicates that such letter 
did not reach the Utah State Bar. Certainly, Mr. Hansen upon 
-10-
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receiving the September 24 letter had adequate notice that 
his September 20 letter had not been received and should have 
taken some affirmative action in such an important matter. 
Thus, Hansen had adequate notice of the Disciplinary Screen-
ing Committee Hearing and failed through his own actions to 
attend such meeting. 
Rule I of the Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar required that a complaining client give a "full and 
complete statement of the facts upon which the accusation is 
based" to the State Bar. It does not require the complaining 
client to specifically allege violations of ethical canons. 
Hansen would seem to argue that before a valid charge could 
be made against a lawyer the client must determine what viola-
tions of the ethical rules have occurred. Such an interpreta-
tion is unfounded. 
The letter of Kay Lou stated that she paid Hansen a $5,000 
retaining fee, that he had undertaken the defense of Ted Burr, 
that he had not contacted her concerning the preparation of her 
case, that she expected to pay Hansen for any work he had per-
formed but could not believe he had done anything to prepare 
the case, and that she was greatly concerned about the conflict 
of interest between Burr and herself. (Ex. 20). 
Certainly these facts were sufficient to apprise Hansen 
of Kay Lou's claim of a conflict and of her concern over the 
:~e which had been paid to him. 
-11-
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A preliminary investigation of a State Bar Association 
is merely for the purpose of deciding whether formal charges 
should be brought. Hogan v. State Bar, 228 P.2d 554 (Cal. 
1951). It is the function of the Screening Committee to sift 
out the facts of a lawyer's representation of a client and to 
determine if a violation of ethical standards has occurred. 
If a client is unhappy with a lawyer's conduct the client has 
the opportunity to tell the full story to the Screening Com-
mittee for its determination whether such conduct constituted 
a violation of ethical standards. It is not the function of 
the client to decide beforehand what violations had occurred 
since in most cases the client will not know the intricate 
rules and regulations concerning a lawyer's conduct. 
Hansen was not denied due process as to the opportunity 
to attend the Screening Committee hearing nor as to the sub-
ject matter of the hearing. 
B. Hansen Has Not Been Deprived Due Process Concerning 
the Charges of Violating DR5-105. 
The Utah State Bar will readily admit that the initial 
complaint filed in this action by the Screening Committee er-
roneously referred to DRS-101 rather than DRS-105. This mis-
take was caused either by a typographical error or by inadver-
tence on the part of the Screening Committee since both sec-
tions involve a conflict of interest. 
This mistake, however, is hardly worthy of twelve pages 
-12- I 
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of Hansen's brief and the extensive claims and charges made 
within those pages. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-30). There 
can be no doubt from a review of this record that Hansen, his 
attorney, the Utah State Bar prosecutors, the Hearing Commit-
tee, and the Utah State Bar Commission all were aware that 
the substance of Section 5-105 was being alleged and for Han-
sen to claim, "He was never given notice of the charge with 
which he was ultimately convicted" (Appellant's brief, p. 19) 
is simply not true. 
The initiating complaint of Kay Lou Jenkins clearly sta-
ted her concern with the conflict between Hansen's representa-
tion of her and Mr. Burr. She stated, "I feel there is con-
flict of interest in the behalf of Mr. Hansen". (Ex. 20). 
Hansen's letter to the State Bar dated November 11, 1976 
also speaks in terms of the dual representation of Burr and 
Kay Lou and states, "She consented that I could represent Mr. 
Burr in his criminal case and continue to represent her in the 
civil case". Hansen then quotes DR5-105(C) which states that 
a lawyer may represent multiple clients if he can adequately 
represent their interests and if each consents to the represen-
tat ion. (Ex. 6). 
A portion of the formal complaint filed against Hansen 
states the following: 
That during the pendency of the Civil Pro-
ceedings aforesaid in which he had con-
-13-
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tracted to represent the complainant, the 
aforesaid Phil L. Hansen, undertook the de-
fense of Ted Burr in a criminal proceeding 
without the knowledge or consent of the 
complainant, that he intimated to her that 
his handling of the criminal proceeding 
could be of assistance of them in her law-
suit. 
Hansen in his answer denied any violation of the Canon 
of Ethics and affirmatively alleged that his conduct "is 
squarely within the terms of DR5-105(C)" and then stated the 
rule once again that a lawyer may represent multiple clients 
if he can adequately represent the interests of each and if 
each consents to the representation. 
In his deposition Hansen stated: "I wanted her consent 
because of the Canon of Ethics that I cited in my letter to 
the Bar about consent of both parties." (Hansen Depa., p. 36). 
At the hearing itself Hansen stated he realized at the 
time the importance of getting Kay Lou's consent before he 
could represent Burr and again cited DR5-105(C). (Tr., pp. 
82-83, 116). 
For Hansen now to complain in this appeal that he had no 
notice of the charge against him concerning this conflict is 
truly incredible. 
It is difficult, for example, to understand how Hansen 
did not have notice of the correct 5-105 provision when he spe-
cifically and repeatedly referred to the affirmative defense 
of 5-lOS(C) in his answer and throughout t~e ~roceedings. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DR5-105(C) specifically states the following: 
In the situations covered by DR5-105(A) and 
~' a lawyer may represent multiple clients 
if it is obvious that he can adequately re-
present the interest of each and if each 
consents to the representation after full 
disclosure of the possible effect of such 
representation on the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of 
each. (Emphasis added). 
If Hansen truly believed he was being charged under 5-101 why 
would he repeatedly refer to 5-105(C) which is by its own 
terms limited solely to 5-105 (A) and (B)? 
Hansen's attempt to exploit the initial mistake in the 
complaint can only be deemed as a last desperate effort to 
avoid the substance of the charge itself. However, for the 
sake of argument Hansen's claim of lack of due process is 
without merit even assuming that the initial mistake in the 
complaint was not corrected by Hansen's obvious notice of the 
correct charge and his failure to object to it throughout the 
proceedings. 
Disciplinary proceedings before a State Bar are techni-
cally neither civil nor criminal in character. McComb v. Corn-
mission on Judicial Performance, 564 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1977). A 
disciplinary proceeding is an internal action conducted by a 
State Bar Association and the State's highest court to deter-
mine if a lawyer should remain as an officer of the court. As 
such, it is governed by its own rules as supplemented by the 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Under any standard Hansen has not been denied due pro-
cess. Had this been a criminal offense Section 77-21-8, 
U.C.A. would have required that the offense be stated suffi-
ciently to "give the court and the defendant notice of what 
offense was intended to be charged". Paragraph 4 of subdivi-
sion III clearly sets out the facts going to the conflict of 
interest charge and the language following the erroneous DRS-
101 further states: 
In that he has undertaken employment in-
terests adverse or in conflict with the 
interests of his client. 
Such complaint clearly gave Hansen notice of the charge against 
him especially when read in light with the initiating letter of 
Kay Lou Jenkins. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure Hansen's failure to 
object at the time of hearing to the erroneous citation waived 
any right to object and allowed an amendment to be made to 
conform to the evidence. The Supreme Court of New Mexico clear-
ly stated this rule when it said: 
It is true that the complaint of the Grie-
vance Committee failed to allege respondent's 
wrongful retention of monies dispersed for 
insurance premiums. This court has held that, 
in the absence of any objection to evidence 
on issues raised by the pleadings, the party 
failing to object has impliedly consented to 
the amendment of the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence.. .The record does not indicate 
that respondent offered any objection to the 
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evidence brought out in the testimony of 
several witnesses concerning the reten-
tion of insurance premium money. Respon-
dent cross-examined the witness concern-
ing the premium money and, in his final 
statement to the Commission, made reference 
to the money. 
We hold that respondent impliedly consented 
to the amendment of the pleadings to con-
form to the evidence adduced at the hear-
ing and respondent's contention is without 
merit. In Re Sedillo, 498 P.2d 1353 (N.M. 
1972). 
Here, Hansen made no objection to the erroneous section num-
ber, testified as to the consent given by Kay Lou, and cross-
examined Kay Lou as to this consent. Under Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an amendment has been made to 
conform to the evidence since no prejudice has been shown by 
Hansen and this Court should so hold. Buehner Block Co. v. 
Glezos, 310 P.2d 517 (1966). 
Finally, as to Bar proceedings themselves it is univer-
sally held that as long as sufficient facts are alleged against 
an attorney he is put on notice as to any violation of the Ca-
non of Ethics since "It is encumbent on every attorney to 
know the disciplinary rules regulating his profession." State 
v. Turner, 538 P.2d 966 (Kan. 1975); In Re Kellar, 493 P.2d 
1039 (Nev. 1972); In Re Lenske, 523 P.2d 1262 (Or. 1974). 
The cases cited by Hansen in support of his due process 
~rgurnent are not applicable to the instant case. These cases 
involve instances where attorneys were not formally charged, 
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where amendments were made during the Bar proceedings dif-
ferent from the original complaint, or where no hearing at 
all was held. In the Ruffalo case cited by appellant (brief, 
p. 21) an amendment to the original charges was made on the 
second day of Bar Commission hearings with no prior notice 
that such a charge was being considered. 
In the Evans case (Appellant's brief, p. 23) the original 
complaint had no correlation either factually nor legally with 
the ultimate charge issued against the lawyers. This case in-
volved prior procedure before the present Rules of Discipline 
were established. 
In the Oliver case (Appellant's brief, p. 24) the lawyer 
was given no opportunity for a hearing to answer the charges 
against him and the matter was remanded to the Bar Association 
for further consideration. In the Foster case (Appellant's 
brief, p. 25) the court required that the charges be filed in 
writing, that notice of the charges be given, and that a hear-
ing be held as to the charges. 
Finally, in the Berkley case, (Appellant's brief, p. 27) 
the lawyers were charged with soliciting and advertising but 
were ultimately convicted of completely separate charges. 
Hansen was not denied due process in the conflict of in-
terest charge and to make such a claim can only illustrate 
the weakness of his position on this appeal. 
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C. Hansen Was Not Denied Due Process of Law Concerning 
the Violation of DR2-106. 
Hansen complains in his brief that except for the alle-
gation in the complaint that he had charged a fee that was 
clearly excessive he had no notice prior to the formal hear-
ing "of any charge that the fee in question was excessive or, 
for that matter, improper for any other reason". (Appellant's 
brief, p. 30). He then complains that the initial letter of 
Kay Lou Jenkins failed to advise him of any problem with his 
fee and finally concludes that he was given no opportunity to 
present any defense to the Screening Committee. Hansen's com-
plaints are not justified by the record in this case. 
The letter of Kay Lou Jenkins stated that she had paid 
Hansen $5,000 and further stated that she expected to pay Han-
sen for any services he had performed but did not believe he 
had done anything to prepare the case. (Ex. 20). 
In the second week of September prior to the Screening 
Committee hearing Kay Lou met with Phil Hansen and discussed 
his continued employment of the case. At that time she asked 
for a refund of her retainer fee. Hansen was obviously aware 
of her desire for a refund since in his letter of October 1, 
1976 to Kay Lou Jenkins he wrote the following: 
You will remember that my nonrefundable fee 
of $5,000 was the amount upon which we agreed 
as payment in full for all necessary pre-
paration and court appearances through trial, 
if necessary, and also if the matter were 
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settled before trial. 
In your letter to the Utah State Bar Asso-
ciation, you indicated that you were will-
ing to pay for the services I had rendered 
thus far but insinuated that if you were to 
substitute counsel that a refund would be 
expected. This is contrary to our initial 
agreement relative to the fact that I would 
not charge you on a piecemeal basis or an 
hourly rate, but that the $5,000 fee was 
for win, lose, or draw, at any stage of the 
completion of your case through trial, if 
necessary, from the date of your contract-
ing with me to represent you. (Ex. 5). 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, Hansen knew from the letter and from his own conversa-
tions with Kay Lou that she was concerned about not receiving 
her money back if she was to hire another lawyer. 
In addition, the question of the refundability of the 
fee and the basis upon which Hansen sets a fee was extensively 
gone into during his deposition. (Hansen Depa., pp. 22-29). 
It is obvious from reading this testimony that all facets of 
his fee arrangement were examined and he was repeatedly asked 
to justify the $5,000 fee which he had charged Kay Lou. 
Adequate notice of the general charge of excessive fee 
was clearly given by the complaint. DR2-106 is the only ethi-
cal standard relating to the amount and structure of a fee. 
It advised Hansen that the flat fee was being challenged as 
to the basis of the original demand and as to the work that 
was actually performed based upon that fee. In other words, 
while $5,000 may have been reasonable if the matter went to 
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trial it would be completely unreasonable if the client wished 
to terminate the lawyer and only five hours of work had been 
done. Hansen completely ignores paragraph 4 of Rule V of the 
Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar which states: 
"Depositions and discovery may be held and conducted in ac-
cordance with Rules 26 to 37 inclusive of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." If Hansen was not satisfied with the spe-
cifics of the initial charge he certainly could have sent in-
terrogatories or conducted other discovery proceedings to 
satisfy his desire. No discovery was undertaken by Hansen, 
however, in this respect since, once again, Hansen as well as 
all of the other parties concerned were aware of the charges 
concerning his fee structure. 
During the hearing Hansen's counsel questioned Kay Lou 
specifically about the refund issue. (Tr., p. 33). Hansen 
was asked by the prosecutor as to his arrangement with Kay Lou 
regarding the refundability of the fee and Hansen went into 
elaborate detail as to his understanding with her. (Tr., pp. 
62, 66-68). Subsequently Commissioner Sorenson asked Hansen 
whether he would refund the money to Kay Lou and he replied 
that he did not believe he had any legal obligation to do so 
and that he did not think he should be dictated to by the Bar 
or Kay Lou as to how much that should be. (Tr., p. 118). At 
no time during the proceedings did Hansen object that the 
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question of refund was not properly plead. Accordingly, any 
such claim has been waived and cannot be raised at this time. 
In Re Sedillo, 498 P.2d 1353 (N.M. 1972). 
Hansen was not denied due process of law in the charge 
of violating DR2-106. Throughout the proceedings he had ade-
quate notice that both the amount of his fee and the struc-
ture of his fee was being scrutinized and examined by the 
Utah State Bar and because of this knowledge did not offer 
any objection to the testimony at the hearing. This claim 
of due process can only be termed as a smokescreen attempt 
to divert this Court from an examination of the substance of 
the charge. 
D. The Board of Commissioners Based its Order on Proper 
Evidence and Proper Procedure. 
Appellant Hansen argues in his brief that the Utah State 
Bar Commission did not properly review the evidence intro-
duced in this case but merely rubber-stamped the findings of 
the Hearing Committee. (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35). 
Of all of Hansen's claims this is the most brazen. How 
can appellant Hansen make statements such as "The most that 
can be said is that the full Bar Commission met and listened 
to the three commissioners who constituted the Hearing Commit-
tee. .and then adopted as its own the evidentiary findings 
of the [Committee] without any independent examination of a 
single piece of evidence"? The Court will note that there is 
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no record as to what transpired at the Board of Corrunissioners' 
meeting and Hansen's statement as to what went on is pure and 
simple speculation on his part. 
Hansen's apparent factual statements concerning this 
failure are typical of his asserted statements throughout his 
brief which are equally unsupported by the record. It is 
clearly surprising that Hansen would make such an attack upon 
the distinguished members of the Utah State Board of Comrnis-
sioners without some evidentiary basis for his accusation. 
This claim of procedural infirmity together with the 
other claims must fall. Hansen was clearly not denied due 
process of law as to any of the charges made against him as 
is amply demonstrated by the exhibits and record in this case. 
His claim of due process deficiency must be deemed as an at-
tempt to camouflage the substantive issues of this case. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW FILED BY THE HEARING COMMITTEE AND 
APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 
THE UTAH STATE BAR ARE SUPPORTED BY PRO-
PER EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT ARBITRARY OR CA-
PRICIOUS. 
Although the action of the Utah State Bar Comrnission is 
only a recommendation upon which this Court may act, this Court 
has held repeatedly that it will presume the action of the Bar 
to be correct and proper and will not change it unless the Corn-
1ission has acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or beyond the 
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scope of its powers. In Re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593 (Utah 1974). 
This Court has also stated that it will not lightly disregard 
the unanimous conclusions reached by those appointed to seek 
out the facts unless they have misconceived the nature of the 
relationship between counsel, client, and the court, or have 
misinterpreted the facts. In Re King, 322 P.2d 1095 (Utah 
1968). 
Hansen asserts that the recommendation of the Board of 
Commissioners "is unreasonable and excessive." He states, "It 
reflects prejudice and jealousy" and not concern with any dan-
ger to the public caused by his conduct. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 49). (Emphasis added) . Such statement again illustrates 
Hansen's unsupportable position since he finds it necessary to 
repeatedly attack the members of the Utah State Bar Commission 
rather than the merits of his case. This statement also illus-
trates Hansen's attitude throughout these proceedings that he 
is somehow above all other lawyers and is entitled to do any-
thing he desires. His claim that Commissioners Lee, Beaslin, 
Frandsen, Gould, Hansen, Kipp, Moffat, Moyle, and Sorenson are 
"jealous" needs no further comment. 
The Utah State Bar Commission and its committee have care-
fully considered the case against Hansen as evidenced by the 
diminuation of charges initially made against him. The compl3i: 
in this case charged Hansen with violation of five specific 
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Bar prosecutors moved to dismiss two of these charges and such 
dismissal was granted by the Hearing Committee. (Tr. , p. 3) • 
The final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the 
Hearing Committee concerned the violation only of DR5-105 and 
2-106--disrnissing the charge under 1-102(5). This process of 
elimination of charges shows without question that the Bar Corn-
mission acted honestly and prudently in sifting the evidence 
and weighing it with the disciplinary standards established by 
this Court. 
Hansen attacks the findings and conclusions of the Bar 
Committee as not supported by the evidence. In most cases, 
however, Hansen cites evidence most favorable to himself and 
ignores conflicting evidence which the Bar Commission accep-
ted as true. The following review of the Record and the find-
ings entered by the Bar Commission amply support the Comrnis-
sion's recommendation to suspend Hansen for one year from prac-
ticing law in Utah. 
A. The Bar Commission was Correct in Finding that Hansen 
had Violated DR5-105 in that he Represented Two Conflicting 
Clients Simultaneously Without Obtaining the Consent of One 
Client and with No Showing That the Clients were Informed as to 
the Conflict. 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 states the following: 
DR5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employ-
ment if the Interests of Another Client May 
Impair the Independent Professional Judgment 
of the Lawyer. 
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A. A lawyer shall decline proffered em-
ployment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely af fec-
ted by the acceptance of the proffered em-
ployment, except to the extent permitted un-
der DRS-105 (c). 
B. A lawyer shall not continue multiple 
employment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely affected 
by his representation of another client, ex-
cept to the extent permitted under DR5-105(c). 
C. In the situations covered by DR5-105(A) 
and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple cli-
ents if it is obvious that he can adequately 
represent the interest of each and if each 
consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such repre-
sentation on the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment on behalf of each. 
It should be noted at the offset that there is no ques-
tion that Hansen represented Ted Burr in the criminal case 
simultaneously with representing Kay Lou in the civil case. It 
also should be noted that Hansen himself admitted that be be-
lieved it was necessary to obtain the consent of Kay Lou before 
he could represent Ted Burr. (Tr., pp. 82-83). Thus, it can 
be assumed without question that Hansen represented multiple 
clients in a situation which his independent professional judg-
ment would be or would likely be adversely affected by his re-
presentation of another client. The sole question is whether 
Kay Lou had consented to this dual representation and whether 
Hansen had given full disclosure to her of the possible effect 
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of such representation as is required by DR5-105(C) which Han-
sen repeatedly relied upon as his defense. 
It should also be noted at this point that while Hansen 
attacks the findings of the Bar Commission for referring to 
Kay Lou Behunin as an individual rather than a corporation 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40) such distinction is irrelevant. 
First, Kay Lou is the sole stockholder of the corporation (Tr., 
p. 13) and secondly even Hansen admitted himself that the com-
plaint attacked Kay Lou personally as well as the corporation. 
(Tr., p. 112). Hansen's extensive attack upon this "error" 
again illustrates his preoccupation with form over substance. 
The following is a review of the Findings of Fact issued 
by the Bar Commission which are relevant to the question of 
conflict and a brief discussion of each finding with reference 
to the evidence introduced at the hearing: 
(3) That Kay Lou Behunin, also known as Kay Lou Johnson 
Wheeler, resided in Salina, Utah and was married in 1975 to 
Randall Johnson. That Johnson at that time owned a Chevrolet 
dealership jointly with Ted Burr. Johnson subsequently bought 
out Burr's interest, and in November of 1975 Mrs. Behunin di-
'1orced Johnson and purchased the entire Chevrolet dealership. 
This finding is undisputed by Hansen. 
(4) That in the latter part of 1975 Ted Burr sued Mrs. 
Behunin and Mr. Johnson over alleged deficiencies in the accoun-
ting of the dealership's sale. That prior to that time Mrs. 
Behunin had never been involved in civil litigation other than 
divorce proceedings. 
Hansen questions this finding by stating that the inference is 
t~at Kay Lou was a naive, unsophisticated, ill-equipped indivi-
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dual to strike a fair bargain with a lawyer. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 37). Hansen then states that since she was presi-
dent and sole stockholder of this corporation she obviously 
was a sophisticated business person who ought to have known 
whether or not she was getting a good bargain. Hansen's state-
ment, like many others, is his opinion and speculation. It 
can just as easily be said that the fact a person is a good 
business man or woman does not mean they are familiar with the 
cost and procedures of litigation. 
(15) That during the summer of 1976 .Mr. Burr was charged 
in the District Court of Sevier County, which was the same 
court in which Mr. Burr had sued Mrs. Behunin and that after 
being charged with a felony Mr. Burr requested that respondent 
represent him as defense counsel. 
There is no dispute as to the accuracy of this finding. The 
fact that the suit was to take place in the same court in a 
small town compounded the representation by Hansen of both cli-
ents as was thoroughly discussed in the hearing. (Tr., pp. 94-
95, 129-130). 
(16) That after being contacted by Mr. Burr, the respon-
dent advised Mrs. Behunin that he was representing or intended 
to represent Mr. Burr, and Mrs. Behunin advised respondent that 
this was contrary to her wishes. 
This finding as to the consent of Mrs. Behunin was the gravamen 
of the hearing concerning the conflict of interest. Kay Lou 
testified that in June or July of 1976 she contacted Hansen at 
the Helper Club in Carbon County. (Tr., pp. 20-21). Accord-
ing to her testimony Hansen called her and requested that he ,c<:c 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
her about the case. She testified that she met him at the 
Helper Club in a back bar room and that he requested she ac-
company him to a motel to discuss the business. (Tr. , p. 2 2) • 
She informed him she did not want to discuss any business in 
a ~otel room and asked what he wanted. She then testified he 
informed her he had been contacted by Ted Burr, plaintiff in 
the suit filed against her, and that he was considering re pre-
sen ting him in his criminal defense. (Tr., p. 22) • 
Kay Lou testified she knew Burr had been charged because 
she had read about it in a newspaper and was familiar with the 
charges from hearsay in the town. (Tr., pp. 22-35). She tes-
tified at the time she told Hansen she was afraid the legal 
charges involved transactions of the dealership and that she 
was afraid some of the dealership's property was involved. 
(Tr., pp. 22-26). She also told Hansen she did not want to 
be connected with the situation at all and that she did not 
want Hansen to have her records which were vital to her case. 
She testified she was afraid that Burr may receive some infor-
mation through Hansen. (Tr., p. 26). She testified that Han-
sen told her he hadn't decided to take the case but would ad-
vise her of his decision that night. (Tr., p. Z6) • 
She testified that that night he subsequently called her 
and said he would not take the Burr case. She stated that 
this was good and it was a great relief to her. (Tr . , p . 2 7 ) . 
Kay Lou testified that shortly thereafter she heard by 
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word-of-mouth that Hansen had indeed taken the Burr case. 
(Tr., p. 28). She then tried many times to contact Hansen and 
tell him that she was dissatisfied about him taking the case 
but he never returned her calls. Subsequently, approximately 
one month after her orig in al conversation with Hansen concerninc 
Burr she wrote the initiating letter to the Utah State Bar com-
plaining of this conflict. (Ex. 20). 
Ten days after the Bar notified Hansen of the complaint 
she met with Hansen and "made it very clear that I had not 
told him it was all right" to defend Ted Burr. (Tr., p. 32). 
He told her to think it over awhile and to talk it over. (Tr., 
p. 33). 
Hansen testified that he met Kay Lou at the Helper Club 
at her insistence and that it was only for the purpose of be-
ing advised about the criminal charge pending against Burr. 
He stated that he had not even known Burr at that time. (Tr., 
pp. 73-75). 
Hansen testified that later he was contacted by Burr and 
told him that he could not represent Burr unless he received 
the approval of Kay Lou. (Tr., p. 82). He accordingly called 
her and she agreed to the dual representation. (Tr., p. 82). 
He admitted at the hearing that he had no documentary evidence 
showing her consent or no other witnesses to verify that her 
consent was given. (Tr., p. 8 5) • 
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(17) That the respondent undertook the representation of 
Mr. Burr while at the same time representing Mrs. Behunin in 
the civil action filed against her by Mr. Burr. 
This finding is also undisputed. Hansen represented Burr from 
the summer of 1976 to the time of the hearing before the Panel. 
Shortly before the hearing Burr was convicted of five counts 
of receiving stolen property. (Tr., p. 70). Hansen was still 
representing Burr on the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Hansen's employment with Kay Lou was terminated in October of 
1976 (according to Kay Lou's testimony; (Tr., p. 33, Ex. 15) 
or February of 1977 according to Hansen's testimony (Tr., p. 89, 
Ex. 5, Appellant's brief, p. 29). 
(18) That the respondent did not obtain the permission of 
Mrs. Behunin to represent Mr. Burr and that after Mrs. Behunin 
learned of the respondent's representation of Mr. Burr, she 
filed a written complaint with the Utah State Bar. 
The question of permission has been discussed previously under 
Finding 16. 
The following two conclusions were made by the Screening 
Committee and subsequently adopted by the Board of Commissioners. 
1. That the conduct of the respondent violates Rule 4, 
Canon 5, DR5-105, in that the undertaking by respondent of the 
representation of Ted Burr prevented the respondent from exer-
cising independent professional judgment in behalf of his cli-
ent, Mrs. Behunin, or was likely to so impair his professional 
judgment. 
Kay Lou testified that she was concerned about Hansen's repre-
sentation of Burr because of the possible involvement of the 
~ealership in the fraudulent transaction since there were ques-
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tions raised by the authorities whether some of the items in-
volved in the criminal case had been purchased through the 
dealership. In addition, Burr had an office at Kay Lou's dea-
lership and she felt uneasy about the dual representation. 
(Tr., p. 26). Hansen testified that the two cases were com-
pletely dissimilar although he admitted that later he dis-
covered dealership typewriters had been turned over by Kay Lou 
to the police (Tr., p. 99) and that Burr was charged with pos-
session of a gun he owned during the time of his involvement 
in the Chevrolet corporation. (Tr . , p • 9 2 ) • 
Innumerable conflicts are apparent from a dual represen-
tation by Hansen of the two clients. If, for example, Hansen 
failed to properly prepare Burr's defense and Burr was convic-
ted of the felony, Hansen could then impeach Burr in the civil 
case for the felony conviction which could be attributable to 
Hansen's own efforts. (Tr., p. 102). Hansen admitted he told 
Kay Lou that Burr's credibility "wouldn't be too hot" if he 
were convicted. The delay in the civil case was obviously 
caused by Hansen's reluctance to depose Burr at the same time 
he was representing him. (Tr • , p . 1 0 3 ) . 
Other conflicts are also apparent., Hansen could have 
learned of facts from either client during his representation 
which may have been pertinent to the defense or prosecution of 
the other's case. Hansen denied disclosing any confidences to 
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either client but he certainly could not deny the opportunity 
nor the appearance of impropriety in the dual representation. 
Hansen may have been forced to pursue Burr to collect a money 
judgment obtained in a civil case while at the same time ap-
pealing his conviction in the criminal case. 
These facts together with the testimony at the hearing 
show that Hansen could not possibly represent both clients 
effectively without an impairment of his professional judgment 
and without the appearance of a severe conflict. 
2. That the respondent continued in the employ of both 
Mr. Burr and Mrs. Behunin, even though his independent pro-
fessional judgment was or was likely to have been adversely 
affected or impaired, notwithstanding Mrs. Behunin advising 
the respondent that she did not want the respondent to repre-
sent Mr. Burr while the respondent was representing her. 
As has been previously discussed Kay Lou testified repeatedly 
that she informed Hansen she did not want him to represent Burr. 
(Tr., pp. 26, 27, 30, 32). There certainly is no doubt from 
the August 25, 1976 letter to the Bar that Kay Lou did not want 
this dual representation. (Ex. 20). 
After learning of Kay Lou's dissatisfaction with his dual 
representation Hansen never informed Kay Lou that he would not 
represent Burr. He told her during the September conference 
to think it over as to whether he could continue the dual re-
presentation. According to his letter of October 1, 1976 it 
was agreed between himself and Kay Lou that she would contact 
1im to let him know whether she wished him to continue her de-
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fense. (Ex. 5). Hansen, therefore, neither obtained Kay Lou's 
initial permission to represent Burr nor agreed to drop that 
case upon her complaint. He continued to keep her money, how-
ever, even after she informed him that she did not want this 
dual representation and had obtained another lawyer. 
This review of the findings by the Commission shows that 
they were based upon substantial evidence and were not made ar-
bitrarily or capriciously. 
It is undisputed that Hansen represented both Burr and Kay 
Lou concurrently. This concurrent representation created both 
an actual conflict upon Hansen and an appearance of impropriety. 
DR5-105 assumes that a lawyer will not represent multi-
clients unless provision (C) has been complied with. This pro-
vision requires that if it is obvious a lawyer can represent 
the interests of each party then each person must consent to 
the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect 
of such conflict. Hansen recognizes affirmative defense of con 
sent in paragraph 6 of his answer and during the hearing. (Tr. 
p. 16). 
The burden is upon Hansen to show that all clients involve 
were properly informed of any possible conflict and gave their 
consent. See Clancy v. State Bar of California, 454 P.2d 329 
(Cal. 1969). There was a sharp dispute in the testimony betwee 
Hansen and Kay Lou concerning the representation of Burr. Ka~ 
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Lou consistently stated that she never approved such represen-
tation because of her fears the business would be involved in 
the criminal case and for a number of other reasons. She wrote 
the letter to the State Bar complaining of this dual represen-
tation within one month after Hansen elected to take the Burr 
case. 
Hansen denies Kay Lou's failure to consent but has no do-
cumentation or independent witnesses substantiating his claim. 
He also produced no evidence that Ted Burr approved of the 
dual representation. Thus, the credibility of the witnesses 
was sharply at issue and it was up for the trier of fact, in 
this case the Hearing Committee, to weigh the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
Hansen argued throughout the proceedings that the cases were 
completely unrelated and therefore no conflict existed. It was 
shown, however, that certain typewriters turned over to the au-
thorities by Kay Lou were in the possession of the dealership 
and had some link to Burr's previous illegal activity. (Tr., p. 
99). Likewise, the gun mentioned during the hearing also in-
volved the same period of time. (Tr., p. 92). The fact that 
the authorities examined Kay Lou's records and inventory at the 
dealership again revealed at least the appearance of some con-
nection between the dealership and Burr's criminal activity. 
!Tr., p. 25). 
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But even without an actual conflict between the two cases 
there still remains an apparent credibility conflict in the 
dual representation. Hansen was defending Kay Lou in a suit 
where she was charged with failing to properly pay Ted Burr 
the money owing to him. In the counterclaim Hansen alleged 
that Burr was untruthful in making defamatory statements against 
Kay Lou and the dealership. (Tr., p. 112). Obviously, Hansen 
had to attack the credibility of Burr to succeed in the defense 
and counterclaim of the civil suit. 
At the same time, however, Hansen had to defend Burr on 
criminal charges attacking the accusations of the State that 
Burr was dishonest. To compound matters both cases were filed 
in a small town or county where the jury could not help but 
know of the dual representation. 
The cases are obviously factually connected and even if 
they were not the Canons of Ethics allow such dual represen-
tation only in extreme cases where the clients are fully in-
formed of the potential conflicts. Here, there was no evidence 
that Burr was ever informed of the conflict and certainly no 
evidence that Kay Lou was told all of the ramifications of such 
a dual representation even if it were assumed that she did in 
fact give her consent. 
An examination of similar cases in other states supports 
Hansen's violation of the Professional Code. In Grievance Com-
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mittee of the Bar of Hartford County v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 
(Conn. 1964) a law firm represented a client in several minor 
collection cases for a period of years. While still maintain-
ing the collection actions the law firm instituted a suit 
against the client for assault and battery and sought to exe-
cute on the client's house. The lawyers vehemently maintained 
that they did not violate any ethical code since the two cases 
had nothing in common. The Supreme Court of Connecticut re-
jected this contention. In supporting the lower court's deci-
sion the Supreme Court stated: 
The Court found such violations to exist 
even apart from any consideration of the 
existence of a conflict of interest. In 
other words the Court concluded that a firm 
may not accept any action against a person 
who they are presently representing even 
though there is no relationship between the 
two cases. In arriving at this conclusion 
the Court cited an opinion of the Committee 
on Professional Ethics of the New York Coun-
ty Lawyer's Association which stated in 
part: "While under the circumstances. . . 
maintenance of public confidence in the Bar 
requires an attorney to decline, while re-
presenting such client, any employment from 
an adverse party in any matter even though 
wholly unrelated to the original retainer." 
Id. at 84. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut succinctly stated the 
reasons why ~r. Hansen should not have represented both Mr. 
Burr and Kay Lou concurrently. The Court stated: 
We feel this rule should be rigidly follow-
ed by the legal profession. When a client 
engages the services of a lawyer in a gi-
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ven piece of business he is entitled to 
feel that, until that business is finally 
disposed of in some manner, he has the un-
divided loyalty of the one upon whom he 
looks as his advocate and his champion. 
If, as in this case, he is sued and his 
home attached by his own attorney, who is 
representing him in another matter, all 
feelings of loyalty are necessarily des-
troyed, and the profession is exposed to 
the charge that it is interested only in 
money. 
The almost complete absence of authority 
governing a situation where, as in the 
present case, the lawyer is still represen-
ting the client whom he sues clearly indi-
cates to us that the common understanding 
and the common conscience of the Bar is in 
accord with our holding that such a suit 
constitutes a reprehensible breach of 
loyalty and a violation of the preamble 
to the canons of professional ethics. Id. 
at 84-85. 
In a case very similar to this one, In Re Kushinsky, 247 
A.2d 665 (N.J. 1968), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld 
the Bar Commission's finding that a lawyer who represented a 
corporation suing a debtor and concurrently represented the 
debtor in a charge of rape had violated the canons of ethics. 
The Court stated: 
The respondent argues before us that his 
representing ... Damon in the criminal case 
were totally unrelated to his duties as at-
torney for Fencecraft in his actions against 
Damon. While it is true that the ... crimi-
nal action was unrelated to the actions of 
Fencecraft against. .Damon, the respondent 
was under an obligation to devote his full 
allegiance to his first client Fencecraft . 
. It is self-evident that without the con-
sent of Fencecraft the respondent could not 
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fulfill his obligation as an adversary 
to do all in his power to press Damon for 
payment of the judgment, and at the same 
time defend Damon against the criminal 
charge. What would respondent's duties be 
to Fencecraft if in representing Damon he 
were to discover a previously undisclosed 
asset? An attorney, in fairness to either 
client, cannot be permitted to place him-
self in such an ambivalent situation. Id. 
at 666. 
Finally, the New Jersey Court noted that a lawyer must 
have in mind not only the avoidance of a relation which ob-
viously results in a conflict but must also consider the pro-
bability or even remote possibility that such a situation can 
develop. 
In Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Sander-
~, 378 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. App. 1963) a lawyer was disbarred 
for many charges of impropriety, including the representation 
of a woman suing her husband for a divorce while concurrently 
representing the husband in a workman compensation claim. The 
lawyer insisted that the wife agreed that he could represent 
her husband in the workman compensation claim. But the court 
stated that even if the testimony of the wife was entirely dis-
regarded it would be clearly established by the testimony of 
the lawyer himself that he acted improperly in representing 
conflicting interests by accepting a retainer from the husband 
after having accepted employment from the wife. 
In In Re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1966) a lawyer's suspen-
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sion was upheld by the New Jersey Court for the lawyer's re-
presenting a tavern owner in a criminal charge while concur-
rently representing the chief witness against the tavern owner 
in an unrelated civil case. The court again was concerned 
with the appearance of impropriety in such a relationship and 
stated: 
Further, and perhaps even more importantly, 
the impact on the public of Cohn's repre-
sentation of both the State's principal 
witness and the defendant in the revoca-
tion hearing would not be conducive to re-
spect for law, order, and the judicial pro-
cess. Public knowledge of those relation-
ships could and probably would endanger, 
at the least, a serious doubt about the in-
tegrity of the proceedings. Cohn's con-
duct in accepting Vincent as a client re-
veals a basic misconception of ethical 
standards. Id. at p. 7. 
From these cases it is obvious that the fact that two mat-
ters are "unrelated" is not necessarily controlling. Conflicts 
or apparent conflicts are numerous in such situations. Even 
had Hansen fully documented and explained the potential problems 
to both Mr. Burr and Kay Lou it is questionable whether they 
would have the knowledge to understand such a conflict. As 
stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon: 
The unsophisticated client, relying upon 
the confidential relationship with his law-
yer, may not be regarded as able to under-
stand the ramifications of the conflict, 
however much explained to him.. .The con-
sent of both clients does not of itself 
accord complete exoneration. Even if ob-
tained after full disclosure, the consent 
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does not relieve the attorney of searching 
his conscience to discover any latent im-
propriety not readily perceptible to the 
consenting layman. In Re Bovin, 533 P.2d 
171, 174 (Or. 1975) (Emphasis added). 
There is no evidence of consent by either Burr or Kay Lou 
except for Hansen's assertion. Furthermore, Hansen never tes-
tified that he informed either Kay Lou or Burr as to the possi-
ble conflicts which could result from the dual representation. 
He specifically stated that he did not inform Burr that his 
conviction in the criminal case could be used to impeach him 
in the civil case (Tr., p. 102) or that the trial of the civil 
case following the criminal case could make Burr's position 
worse. (Tr., p. 131). Hansen admitted at the hearing that it 
was essential that he obtain the consent of Kay Lou and that 
he failed to document such an important event because he "takes 
people's word". (Tr., pp. 82, 85). 
For these reasons, the Bar Commission was justified in 
finding that Hansen had violated the professional code of re-
sponsibility in representing both clients concurrently. 
B. The Bar Commission was Correct in Finding that Hansen 
had Violated DR2-106 by Charging a Fee Not Based Upon Proper 
Considerations, Including Costs, and Being Nonrefundable. 
DR2-106 states that a lawyer shall not enter into an agree-
ment for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive 
fee. A fee is clearly excessive when "After a review of the 
facts a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a defin-
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ite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reason-
able fee." 
The rule then outlines factors to be considered as guides 
in determining the reasonableness of a fee including the time 
and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question 
involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly, and likelihood that the employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer, the fee customarily charged in the lo-
cality for similar legal services, the amount involved, the re-
sults obtained, the time limitations imposed by the client, the 
nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client, the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, 
and whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
After careful review of the evidence the Hearing Committee 
concluded that both the amount and structure of Hansen's fee 
were improper and clearly excessive in light of the circun-
stances of this case. The Hearing Committee and the Board of 
Commissioners adopted the following findings and conclusions 
concerning this violation: 
(6) That the respondent did indicate that he would take 
the case only if Mrs. Behunin would immediately pay to him the 
sum of $5,000. The respondent informed Mrs. Behunin that the 
money would be retained regardless of whether or not the case 
went to trial. 
It is undisputed that Hansen requested and received the $5,0CO 
fee within one week after the initial interview. Kay Lou tes-
tified that Hansen told her the money would be retained whet~~ 
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it was settled out of court or whether the case went to court. 
(Tr., pp. 16, 47). 
(7) That at the first meeting between respondent and Mrs. 
Behunin, the respondent felt that he should file an answer and 
a counterclaim, which he then did. Other than requesting con-
tinuance of the trial date, no other pleadings were filed by 
respondent. 
It is undisputed that the only pleading filed in the civil ac-
tion during the 1-1/2 years of representation was the Answer, 
Counterclaim, and Cross-claim. (Ex. 23). It consists of four 
pages. 
(8) That at the first meeting when the amount of the fee 
was determined, the respondent felt that the lawsuit was in 
the nature of a breach of contract requiring more factual ac-
counting than legal preparation. 
This finding is in accordance with Hansen's own testimony. 
(Tr., p. 54). 
(9) That the initial meeting lasted approximately 10 to 
15 minutes. 
This fact was undisputed. 
(10) That Mrs. Behunin was not informed that no part of the 
fee was refundable, even if Mr. Hansen was discharged. No con-
tract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing the 
terms of the employment to writing. 
Kay Lou testified at the time of the initial meeting Hansen ne-
ver informed her that the $5,000 fee was non-returnable regard-
less of what events transpired. (Tr., pp. 17-18, 43). No con-
tract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing such 
terms to writing. (Tr., p. 42). Hansen agreed that no writing 
~·;ists showing that such fee was nonrefundable, (Tr., p. 67) 
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but claimed throughout the proceeding that the nonrefundabilit. 
was agreed upon by Kay Lou. 
(11) That the respondent at all times material to these 
proceedings was of the opinion that the fee was not refundable. 1 
Hansen testified to this during the hearing (66, 67) and statec 
it in his letter to the Bar and to Kay Lou. (Ex . 5 , 6 ) • When 
asked whether he thought a refund should be given to Kay Lou 
at the time of the hearing he replied that he may have a moral 
obligation to do so but he did not think it was a legal matter 
or obligation and "I don't think that I should be dictated to 
by the Bar or Kay Lou Wheeler as to how much that should be". 
(Tr., p. 118, 126). No refund has been made. 
(13) That during the period of time that the respondent 
represented Mrs. Behunin in the civil action no depositions 
were taken, nor was any other discovery taken by the respondent. 
This fact is undisputed. 
(14) It was agreed between the respondent and Mrs. Behunin 
that all out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the preparation of 
the case would be paid by respondent out of the $5,000 paid by 
Mrs. Behunin and further that the fee would remain the same re-
gardless of the amount of time or effort expended by respon-
dent in the preparation of the case or the result obtained. 
Kay Lou testified that Hansen did not say anything about costs 
but that she assumed that the $5,000 fee would be the total 
47). Hansen cost and nothing else would be added. (Tr., p. 
. 1 Jc- I expenses inc~ ~ · testified that the $5,000 fee would include all 
I 
ing travel, meals, mileage, depositions, and other assistance. 
(Tr., p. 56). 
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Hansen testified that in setting the $5,000 fee he did 
not consider the time required to be spent on the lawsuit. 
(Tr., pp. 58, 117). He likewise stated that the complexity of 
the lawsuit was not taken into consideration except to the ex-
tent that it was in the District Court and did not look to be 
anything out of the ordinary. (Tr., pp. 58-59). This fee 
would be the same whether it took five minutes or five years, 
win, lose, or draw. (Tr., pp. 62, 128; Ex. 5). 
(19) That the Utah State Bar advised the respondent of 
Mrs. Behunin's written complaint and the respondent then con-
tacted Mrs. Behunin, at which time she requested that she would 
like a portion of the fee returned to her and that she would re-
tain other counsel, but that the respondent refused to refund 
any portion of the fee previously paid and refused to withdraw 
as counsel for Mrs. Behunin. 
Kay Lou testified that after Hansen contacted her regarding the 
Bar letter she went to his office and told him that she would 
like to get other counsel and would like some of her money back. 
She told him she would pay him for what he had done but thought 
she had better obtain other legal assistance. (Tr., p. 33). 
She reiterated that at the meeting with Hansen she requested a 
refund of her money less actual work done. (Tr., pp. 41, 4 5) • 
He told her to "think it over" as to his representation. (Tr., 
p. 33). She then called Dean Sheffield and told him she did 
not wish to talk to Hansen any further. (Tr., p. 42). Sheffield 
a.Jvised Hansen of her desire. (Ex. 7). In spite of her request 
't to deal with him further, Hansen "assumed" he was still her 
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lawyer in a letter to her dateJ October 1. (Ex. 5). She did 
not respond to this letter because Sheffield said she didn't 
have to. (Tr., p. 44). 
(20) That thereafter in February of 1977, Mrs. Behunin 
again wrote to the respondent and advised him that new counsel 
had been obtained and requested a refund of the fee, but that 
the respondent again refused to make a refund of any portion 
of the fee. 
This letter is contained as Exhibit 15. In that letter she sta-
ted, "I asked for a refund of my $5,000 less any convenience and 
expense to you". It is undisputed that Hansen has not refunded 
Kay Lou any of her money as of the writing of this brief. 
The Hearing Committee entered the following conclusion 
based upon the findings: 
3. That the conduct of the respondent violated Rule IV, 
Canon 2, DR2-106 for the following reasons: 
(a) The fee of $5,000 charged, collected and retain~ 
was clearly excessive and improper in that the fixing of said 
fee by the respondent did not take into consideration all rele-
vant circumstances, including the time required, the nature of 
the case, the responsibility involved and the results obtained. 
(b) The fee was excessive and improper, since it 
created a conflict of interest between the respondent and his 
client, Mrs. Behunin in that after the payment of the fee by the 
client it would be against the financial interests of the respon· 
dent to incur any out-of-pocket expenses in preparation of the 
case, i.e., the hiring of experts, including accountants, the 
taking of depositions, and even travel. 
(c) The fee arrangement was excessive and improper, 
since by virtue of being nonrefundable the client could not ter-
minate the attorney-client relationship without suffering an 
economic hardship. In effect, the lawyer was no longer accoun-
table to his client for the quality of his services or the pro-
priety of his actions. 
These conclusions were correct based upon the findings pre-
viously stated, other evidence in the trial, and law from otter 
jurisdictions. 
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According to the philosophy of Hansen all clients are at 
arm's length status and any lawyer may ask any amount he so de-
sires if a client is willing to pay it. As he put it, "Some 
lawyers get $100,000 for a lot less than I do for a lot less 
money. Some people charge a million dollar fee." (Tr . , p • 13 6) . 
If, indeed, Hansen were correct concerning the propriety of 
a fee then there would certainly be no need for a canon specif i-
cally prohibiting an "excessive" fee since any fee agreed to by 
a client would necessarily be fair. If such were the case the 
criteria listed in DR2-106(B) would be unnecessary and no analy-
sis of the facts would be required. Obviously, this is not the 
case and the fee of a lawyer cannot be equated to the "market-
place" of selling corn. Ethical considerations as well as econo-
mic considerations must govern the setting of a lawyer's fee. 
A brief analysis of Hansen's statements at the hearing 
clearly shows both his attitude concerning fees and the impro-
priety of his actions. When asked whether the fee took into ac-
count the time to be spent on the lawsuit Mr. Hansen replied 
"No". He likewise stated that the complexity of the lawsuit was 
not taken into consideration except to the extent that it was in 
District Court and it did not look to be anything out of the or-
dinary. (Tr., pp. 58-59). 
Hansen adamantly stated that time involved has no correla-
tion to the amount of fee recovered and that if a case can be 
oettled in 5 hours a thousand dollars an hour is reasonable. 
<'I'r, I P• 65) , 
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Obviously, Ransen's flat fee method produces cases where 
he receives an enormous amount per hour and in other cases per-
haps receives a very low amount per hour. (Tr., p. 106). Han-
sen did not recall ever telling Kay Lou that his method of com-
putation of fees was materially different from that used in 
the normal legal community. (Tr . , p . l O 6 ) . In other words, 
Hansen did not inform Kay Lou nor does he make it a practice to 
inform his other clients of the gamble the client is taking by 
hiring Hansen in a case where a very short number of hours may 
dispose of the entire matter and in which Hansen may be fully 
aware of its ripeness for quick disposal. 
Hansen argues that neither the Hearing Committee nor the 
Board of Commissioners can take it upon themselves to decide 
what a reasonable fee would be under the circumstances without 
any evidence. (Appellant's brief, p. 41) . Obviously, the evi-
dence in this case consisted of the agreement itself, the amount 
of work which Hansen had already done, and the complexity of the 
case as shown from the pleadings. Members of the Hearing Com-
mittee, the Board of Commissioners, and this Court are all law-
yers and in a disciplinary proceeding to determine a violation 
of an ethical rule certainly qualify as lawyers "of ordinary 
prudence" as defined in DR2-106(B). The expression of Hansen 
that the fee is for "five minutes or five years, win, lose, or 
draw" (Tr., p. 62) shows a prudent lawyer that the elements cf 
time and result are not considered in establishing the fee, 3 ~-
cannot meet the criteria established under DR2-106. 
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Hansen argues that the Hearing Conunittee's conclusion that 
paying out-of-pocket expenses from the initial retainer created 
a conflict of interest was based upon pure speculation. (Ap-
pellant's brief, pp. 31-32). Hansen then argues that it is no 
more subject to abuse than when an hourly rate is charged and 
costs are separately added to the client's bill. Hansen con-
tinues that in such a case an attorney may engage in "needless 
discovery to obtain a free vacation to a warm climate in the 
wintertime". (Appellant's brief, p. 32). 
Hansen ignores the fact that the custom of the legal com-
munity is to charge all clients costs in addition to the ini-
tial fee. If a lawyer wishes to go to a warmer climate for a 
vacation and charges his client he must at least be able to 
justify it to the client. Here, however, it is much easier for 
Hansen not to do anything in the way of expenses since the cli-
ent has no input as to what has or has not been done on the case. 
This failure to expend money was no doubt taken into account by 
the Trial Conunittee since no discovery was undertaken in this 
case after 1-1/2 years. 
The inclusion of costs in the initial fee charged by Hansen 
also shows his failure to consider the factors necessary to pro-
perly evaluate a fee. How can Hansen, for example, take into 
consideration all the factors required by Disciplinary Rule 2-
1% when he is not even aware of how much money will be deducted 
:r~m his fee because of litigation costs? 
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Finally, the nonrefundable feature of Hansen's contract 
is also objectionable and in violation of the ethical standards. i 
Hansen seems to believe that regardless of the outcome of a 
case he is entitled to keep the retainer. Hansen's assumption 
is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, a client such as 
Kay Lou Pays the $5,000 fee on the assumption that a favorable 
conclusion, either settlement or trial, will be achieved. Han-
sen admits that a client pays this amount under this assumption. 
(Tr., p. 116). And while the client can hire another lawyer if 
he becomes dissatisfied with Hansen the client can't get his 
money back. Consequently, unless the client is able to raise 
the additional money for a new attorney, the client is forced 
to "ride the case out" with Hansen regardless of his performance. 
(Tr., p. 66). 
The nonrefundability locks a client into Hansen. As sta-
ted by Conclusion 3(c), "In effect, the lawyer was no longer 
accountable to his client for the quality of his services or 
the propriety of his actions". Thus, a client who cannot af-
ford to donate his money to Hansen and then pay another lawyer 
is forced to accept whatever representation Hansen decides to 
give him. Hansen can do as little or as much for the client as 
Hansen desires--the client can only grin and bear it. 
Hansen stated at the hearing that he does not think a re-
fund is legally required regardless of his actions and he does 
not like being told by the Bar what he can or cannot do. (Tr·· 
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p. 118). Hansen in his brief states, "As noted previously, 
if a court found that appellants remained able to render the 
contracted for service, he is entitled to the entire contract 
price upon his wrongful discharge." (Appellant's brief, p. 47). 
Hansen is wrong in all respects concerning the legality 
of his policy. In Kimball v. Public Utility District No. 1 of 
Douglas County, 391 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1964) lawyers were termina-
ted by their clients and claimed they were entitled to the full 
amount initially agreed upon. The Court stated that a client 
at any time may terminate a lawyer "wantonly and without cause" 
and that "If the attorney is discharged or prevented by the 
client from completing the work or undertaking, the measure of 
attorney damages is not the fee agreed upon for completion of 
the task, but reasonable compensation for the professional ser-
vices actually rendered." Id. at 209. See also Salopek v. 
Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942). 
Cases in other jurisdictions clearly show that Hansen's 
"market" theory is untenable and that Hansen's conduct and at-
titude are in clear violation of the professional code of con-
duct. In In Re Greer, 380 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1963) the Supreme 
Court of Washington stated that there can be no dispute between 
any reasonable persons concerning fees for services not ren-
dered. The Court said: 
Can an attorney conscientiously assert that 
his years of study, his learning, his stand-
ing at the Bar, justify his payment for pro-
fessional services where no services were 
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performed? Or can it sensibly be argued 
that money for costs should be kept when no 
costs were incurred? Mere statement of the 
proposition is in itself an answer. By no 
criteria known to us could the attorney be 
permitted to keep either the contingent fee 
on interest never recovered by him or cost 
monies never expended by him. To place the 
stamp of approval on such transactions en-
dorses the unconscionable. Id. at 487. 
A very analogous case to the present situation is Bushman 
v. The State Bar of California, 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974). In 
that case Bushman, the California attorney, was retained by a 
wife for divorce and custody of a minor child. At Bushman's 
request the client signed a promissory note for $5,000 and 
agreed to pay a retainer of not less than $60 an hour. The 
Court noted that the attorney did not produce any records to 
substantiate his claim of 100 hours spent on the case and noted 
that the other attorneys spent slightly more than five hours on 
the case. 
The Supreme Court of California concluded, "The fees char-
ged, and those which Bushman attempted to collect, were ex-
cessive, overreaching, exorbitant, and unconscionable." Id. at 
314. The Court stated, "Furthermore, there was no reasonable 
relationship between the face amount of the note and the ser-
vices actually rendered. The note contained no provision for 
its surrender in the event the actual services performed by 
Bushman did not warrant a $5,000 fee." 
The Supreme Court concluded with affirmance of the defer-
dant' s suspension for one year by stating, "It is appropriate 
_c:; 1-
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to repeat the observation of this Court that the right to prac-
tice law 'is not a license to mulct the unfortunate'". 
Finally, in Potenza v. Oneida County Bar Association, 287 
N.Y.S.2d 138 (App. Div. N.Y. 1968) a lawyer was accused of 
charging an exorbitant fee to a client whose husband was im-
prisoned. According to the opinion the lawyer requested the 
wife to give him $2,000 and he would accordingly obtain the re-
lease of her husband. He claimed that he did extensive legal 
research but as the Court found, "Curiously, however, he made 
no notes of legal principles or authorities resulting from 
such research, and submitted no brief at the hearing." At the 
hearing the defendant attorney obviously viewed a legal fee 
much like Mr. Hansen; that is, any fee obtainable is fair. 
The New York Court specifically rejected this theory and stated: 
Respondent's thinking on the subject of le-
gal fees is perhaps revealed by the testi-
mony of another lawyer called by Potenza. 
That attorney testified that he paid no at-
tention to any schedule of fees--'If I'm 
going to work for a man and he agrees on 
how much to pay me, that ends the matter.' 
The law, of course, is to the contrary. 
Matter of Cohen, 169 App. Div. 544, 547, 
155 N.Y.S. 517, 520, where it was said that 
'It is no less improper for an attorney to 
take advantage of his client's necessities 
and inexperience to induce him to make a 
contract in advance to pay an exorbitant 
fee for service than it is to take advantage 
of those necessities and that inexperience 
to exact an unreasonable fee after the ser-
vices have been rendered.'" Id. at 141. 
In suspending the defendant for a one-year period the Court 
stated: "Charging an exorbitant fee grossly disproportionate 
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to the services performed is misconduct that warrants disci-
plinary action." 
Mr. Hansen's philosophy that legal fees are a fair-trade 
item and that no consideration should be given to the situatioo 
of the client, their familiarity with legal problems, or the 
terrorizing situation they usually are found in does not com-
ply with the Professional Code of Responsibility. Stated by 
the Supreme Court of the state of Nebraska, "In fixing fees it 
should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of 
the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting 
trade." State v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136, 143 (Neb. 1957). 
Hansen has clearly violated the letter and spirit of the 
Utah Code of Responsibility. When the services performed by 
Hansen, the inexperience of Kay Lou in civil lawsuits, and Han-
sen's adamant refusal to legally refund any of the $5,000 are 
all considered no other result can be reached. Hansen's entire 
fee scheme is questionable at best even for sophisticated cli-
ents who are willing to gamble upon the all-or-nothing approach 
Hansen telieves is permissible. But in the cases of uninformed 
clients who are not aware of Hansen's unique "no-time-correlatio 
method of billing, his "no-charge-for-costs" method, and his ·~ 
refund-no-matter-what-happens" system there can be no doubt tha'. 
such a system is tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Hansen complains that an ex post facto application of sar 
policy has been made to Hansen. He states that prominent a~-
-53-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
torneys throughout the United States often require a nonrefun-
dable retainer before they will take a matter on for a new cli-
ent. (Appellant's brief, p. 48). If this unsupported state-
ment is true then these "prominent" attorneys are also commit-
ting ethical violations. No lawyer, no matter how prominent 
he may be, can ethically justify a nonrefundable fee which in 
effect pays the lawyer for work he has not done. 
In the instant case Hansen has completely failed to meet 
his burden in showing that his irregular fee agreement was fully 
understood by Kay Lou and has failed to document in any way his 
claim that Kay Lou fully understood the ramifications of his 
unique billing system. 
The Bar Commission was correct in finding that the billing 
system of Hansen is unreasonable and in violation of the cri-
teria used in determining a fair fee and also that the parti-
cular fee in this case is grossly excessive in light of the work 
actually performed, and in Hansen's criteria for setting the fee. 
POINT III 
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT HANSEN BE SUS-
PENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ONE 
YEAR IS REASONABLE. 
Hansen argues in his brief that this case does not involve 
dishonesty but merely a misunderstanding. Furthermore, Hansen 
argues, there is no evidence that any confidence was ever be-
:rayed or that the client was hurt in any way. (Appellant's 
rief, p. 44). 
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While such argument may at first seem appealing a closer 
examination shows that Hansen's conduct merited one-year sus-
pension. First, Hansen has practiced law since 1950 (Tr., p. 
49) and has been the subject of other disciplinary proceedings 
throughout the years. (Hansen Depo., p. 14). He is not a 
young lawyer out of law school or a lawyer inexperienced as to 
the customs in the community. His testimony throughout the 
proceeding shows his distaste for the so-called "pegboard" la~ 
yers who go by the hour and use conventional fee arrangements. 
It does not require a legal scholar to understand that 
representing two clients simultaneously constitutes a serious 
conflict of interest. Even if it were assumed that Hansen ob-
tained the consent of Kay Lou and Burr this does not excuse him 
from this dual representation in light of the circumstances of 
this case. When it is assumed, however, that no such consent 
was given then the matter is even more serious. 
Hansen as a lawyer was seriously compromised by represent-
ing both parties and his client's and the public's image of 
law and lawyers could not be anything but seriously damaged. 
As stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, "An attorney should 
not only avoid impropriety but should avoid the appearance of 
impropriety." State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. 
Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1957). 
Hansen's charge that this conflict was created by a "trar·' 
by the Bar is absurd. (Appellant's brief, p. 46}. It was KJ. 
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the Bar, who desired to stop communication with Ransen. (Tr., 
p. 42) . If Hansen was so concerned about his continued repre-
sentation of Kay Lou after being notified she did not wish to 
talk to him further, he should have asked the Bar to obtain 
her permission for withdrawal or filed a request with the Court. 
The only trap set was Hansen's desire for two fees--not the 
action of the Bar. 
The $5,000 is equally reprehensible. Hansen charged Kay 
Lou, an unsophisticated client, a fee which was not based upon 
any evaluation of the factors necessary and required by the 
ethical standards. He then refused to refund her fee even 
though her desire for his withdrawal as her counsel was caused 
by his own actions and inaction. Hansen thus attempted to force 
Kay Lou to either maintain his services, conflict or not, or 
lose her $5,000 fee. 
This conduct is certainly no better than a lawyer who co-
mingles a client's money with his own even though the client 
suffers no monetary loss. This Court has on numerous occasions 
approved a one-year suspension for the mere act of co-mingling 
funds with no other showing needed. In Re Lund, 506 P.2d 1273 
(Utah 1973); In Re Hughes, 534 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) 
Lawyers in other jurisdictions have been totally disbarred 
from the practice of law for failing to refund a client's money, 
In Re Hall, 118 P.2d 67 (Ariz. 1941), and for failure to file 
1 '.vill timely, People vs. James, 502 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972). 
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The Bar Commission could properly take into account the 
attitude of appellant Hansen in its decision. In Re Fullmer, 
405 P.2d 343 (Utah 1965). Hansen throughout the proceeding ne-
ver admitted any conflict existed between the two cases, never 
admitted that a "misunderstanding" between himself and Kay Lou 
existed but rather termed her as a liar (Tr., p. 77), never 
agreed that he was legally obligated to pay Kay Lou a refund, 
resented the Bar's interference with the amount of any refund 
(Tr., p. 118), and continually stated that he did not have to 
keep track of his time or his efforts for anybody. 
It should also be remembered that after the initiation of 
the complaint by Kay Lou, Hansen neither offered to withdraw 
from the representation of Burr nor offered to refund Kay Lou 
any of her money. At the time of the hearing he had tried the 
Burr case and still had not refunded any money to Kay Lou even 
though he was no longer employed. No refund has been made at 
this writing. 
The Utah State Bar Commission was certainly justified in 
considering all these factors to merit a one-year suspension fM 
Hansen. In addition, the prosecutors in this case would request 
that Hansen be ordered to give a full and complete accounting c: 
his services and the services rendered by his off ice to Kay Lou 
and to refund his fee based upon the remaining funds not ex-
pended. In the event Kay Lou is dissatisfied with such acccur·-
ing she could then seek recourse through the Utah State Bar or 
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through her own independent court action. 
Finally, Hansen should be ordered to pay the costs of the 
proceedings incurred by the Utah State Bar in the prosecution 
of this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney Phil Hansen has not been denied due process of 
law before the Utah State Bar Commission and its Committee. 
Hansen was adequately apprised of the charges against him by 
the letter of Kay Lou to the Bar and given ample opportunity to 
attend the Screening Committee Hearing. He chose not to attend, 
however, and now complains that it was the Bar's fault for his 
non attendance. 
Hansen complains that he did not know the charges against 
him concerning the conflict of interest in spite of the fact 
he specifically alleged on numerous occasions the very affirma-
tive defense to the charge which was made against him. He also 
claims surprise as to the charges of excessive fee even though 
all facets of the fee were fairly examined prior to the hearing 
and even though Hansen himself did not inquire from the Bar as to 
any clarification of the charges. In addition to all of these 
facts, Hansen did not object to any of the evidence introduced 
at the Bar concerning either the conflict or the fee and cannot 
now claim error. 
The findings of the Bar Commission are amply supported by 
he evidence and are not arbitrary or capricious. Unquestionably 
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Hansen undertook the defense of Kay Lou while simultaneously 
representing her adversary, Ted Burr. It was Hansen's burden 
to show that this dual representation was proper. Hansen could 
not show with any evidence aside from his own statements that 
Kay Lou consented to this representation and offered no testi-
mony that either Kay Lou or Ted Burr were informed as to the 
consequences of the representation. 
There is also no doubt that Kay Lou paid to Hansen $5,000 
to represent her and her company in the civil lawsuit. Hansen's 
computation of $5,000 was not based upon any time relevancy or 
result factor but was a fee calculated to be paid regardless of 
the time required or the result obtained. In addition, Hansen's i 
inclusion of costs in the fee was instrumental in his failure 
to do any discovery or make any expenditures on behalf of Kay 
Lou during the 1-1/2 years of his representation. Finally, his 
adamant refusal throughout the proceedings to refund Kay Lou 
that portion of her money which he had not earned attempted to 
force Kay Lou to continue to retain Hansen whether she desired 
him or not. Such a fee and structure is clearly in violation o'., 
legal ethical standards. 
Finally, the recommendation of the Bar to suspend Hansen 
from the practice of law for one year in Utah was reasonable. 
It was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of :'> 
case and was reasonable in light of other discipli~ary ?rocee~-
ings against other lawyers. Hansen should also be ordered t: 
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give an accounting to Kay Lou and give her a refund in addition 
to paying the Utah State Bar its costs of prosecution. 
The Utah State Bar respectfully requests that its recom-
mendation be adopted by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILLIP R. FISHLER 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Prosecutors for the Utah State Bar 
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